
According to Hogan, Kant claims that such knowledge is possible (only) with respect to appearances given that we must admit an absolute contingency among things in themselves (on account of Kant's doctrine of freedom), which is just to say that they cannot be known a priori. In his essay, "Kant's Copernican Turn and the Rationalist Tradition," Desmond Hogan argues that, some overlooked continuities notwithstanding, Kant's conception of a priori knowledge as extending to non-analytic necessities represents a fundamental shift from that of the antecedent rationalist tradition. The two essays in Part I consider Kant's Critique in light of the background supplied by the rationalist and empiricist traditions. In what follows I will provide a brief summary of each chapter and limit myself to critical comments on the volume's main sections. Obviously, a brief review such as this cannot consider each of these essays in detail, nor would commenting on a handful of essays provide much of an understanding of the quality of the entire volume. The CCCPR consists of an introduction (which looks at the development of the Critique during the silent decade and provides an overview of its aims) and 17 essays arranged under three headings: the background, the arguments, and the impact of Kant's first Critique. Like the Companions to Locke's Essay, Hobbes' Leviathan, and Spinoza's Ethics, this volume collects essays by leading scholars on many of the central topics of the work in question.



The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ( CCCPR) is the latest installment in a Companion series devoted to a single philosophical text rather than a philosopher.
